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20111201
20111231
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. >> in a and a in a few moments a hearing on u.s. policy toward syria. for each of the commissioners, do you believe that employs, professional staff of the nrc have experienced intimidation, hostile or offensive conduct on behalf of the chairman, by the chairman, anything that would be considered to be intimidating, hostile or offensive by the chairman, any professional staff experience that? vs. >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> ladies and gentlemen that is the definition of a. russ: . i hope that we can all agree that is why we voted in the statute. the united nations estimates more than 5000 people have been killed in protests against the government of syrian resident bashar al-assad. up next the house foreign affairs subcommittee hears about these administrations syrian policy from the state department's release coordinator. this is an hour and a half. [inaudible conversations] the subcommittee will come to order. i want to wish everyone good morning and i want to welcome all of my colleagues to this hearing on subcommittee on the middle east and south asia. and the chairman. as has been well-document
about what is going to happen in syria. if we want to counter the iranian studs put effort into putting a good outcome in syria. it would be the biggest blow to the iranians strategically that i can think of. >> i just -- i think it's a very important question that he put forward, and i think that the answer is in constant motion because the region is changing dramatically. therefore the iranian calculations changed dramatically. i think there's no question that the most interesting feeler that the iranians put out was in 2003. when we had smashed iraq in a war that put us on their doorstep. and even that feeler when i talk to people in iran in 2003 who were involved in putting it forward, they said frankly that they didn't have the full approval of the supreme leader, khomeini. so now we your in a totally different situation which iran has to calculate where it stands. i agree very much with the point put forward by the professor menashri that the iranian regime right now is very much interested in its own survival, in the survival of the elite. and if this is seen as a vehicle to help
in that way at one of the things that worries me about syria is when people say oh we can't have it here. we are so different and no one ever expected to happen in baghdadi there. no one expected it to happen in beirut and no one expected it to happen in sarajevo. it can happen anywhere. this was the sector leadership in iraq who found a system of governance that said this many shia, this many sunni, this many kurds work to their advantage. i don't think there was a broadband support for the lebanon the station of the iraqi political system which is why i say that our use of sectarianism undercuts the push to democracy and brother played into the sort of created warlords out of sectarian leaders. >> okay, please. >> microphone. >> the uphold and i'm talking about, october 2003, less than one in five iraqi's sol religion as having any role to play in governance as i recall back then. today you would get some very different numbers. >> thank you. i am from the arab league. i'm not sure if i mentioned are not the number of percentages of iraqi's -- what is the number? >> the democrats, 1000 ira
in the book in the chapter not so subtly that you call setback about iran and north korea, about syria and nonproliferation issues and you suggested various points in the chapter that the bush and administration lost its way, hattie's and to leave your away from the bush doctrine that was so well established in the first term. and i wonder if you see president bush himself lost his nerve. .. had to do with north koreas nuclear aspirations and that tvs, building a nuclear care for the syrians and eastern area th that would allow them all f tonight to produce nuclear weapons and so forth. iide it was one there were i think m significant differences in safety administration.as in many of those were knownod, and, and i thought there were lsons to be , administration having trouble figuring how not to get the north koreans to go nuclear. the clinton administration faced similar problems. the obama administration will have similar problems as well, too. i thought it was important to put down the record, if you will, of how we dealt with that. now, in the final analysis, the president made th
a serious supporter of syria, hamas, and he came to moscow to try to persuade russia and exchange seriously the russian positions on all issues of great importance to israel. he clearly made a proclamation they were negotiating with russia, and met us on great importance to israel that would be not the best time for him to criticize russian government and policies. during the last 20 years, we came to a very different conclusion. we came to a conclusion that after the end of the cold war, we can tell about everybody how they had come back through the affairs, and that we can do it without leverage of u.s. interest and u.s. ability to do things that are very important to us like russian support in iran, like our continuing supplies from russia to afghanistan. things that really affect american security and american lives. whether we should be able to have our cake and eat it too, it's difficult to make a prediction, but i do believe that there's instances when i made an interest in the american values in some conflict, and they also believe that doing what is in the u.s. national interest, t
should be alert, eisenhower said. the presidents of the russian planes and syria would inevitably trigger british and french attacks on the air fields. if that haven't come as he liked to say, that would be in the fire. he inquired of that as the chairman of the trade chiefs whether american naval units were yclept with atomic anti-submarine weapons. not long after the president had left to gettysburg and whitman recalled that the news from the middle east looked so bad that at one point the white house staff contemplated asking the president to turn around and come back to the white house. rumors were rampant with the soviet intervention. some of the bad news came directly from moscow. the american ambassador came that the soviet move had become more ominous and the soviet leaders were prepared to take military action unless the cease-fire was quickly achieved. the staff with the president's return by flying him back instead of having to drive to gettysburg. ike arrived at the white house at 12:38 p.m.. falling short briefing, he strolled into the cabinet room where 18 men were waiting.
Search Results 0 to 5 of about 6